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Abstract 
Within the antitrafficking community, even legal child or youth work is often 
pathologized, seen as a “worst form of child labor” or, where movement is 
involved, as trafficking. Major policy responses thus focus on attempting to 
protect the young by preventing their movement or policing their work. Using a 
case study of adolescent labor migrants in Benin who work in artisanal gravel 
quarries in Nigeria, I provide evidence that suggests that the dominant discourse 
regarding this kind of labor is inaccurate and that policies based on it may be 
failing. This is in large part because the labor migration depicted as “trafficking” 
by the antitrafficking community is not experienced as such by young migrants. 
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Child trafficking emerged as the premier international child protection issue in the 
1990s (International Labour Organization-International Program on the 
Elimination of Child Labour [ILO-IPEC] 2002; O’Connell Davidson 2011; 
Riisøen et al. 2004). Since then, it has predominantly been understood as a 
question of innocent and unsuspecting minors kidnapped and enslaved by criminal 
gangs, their vulnerability compounded by grinding poverty or corrupt traditional 
practices. Dominant policy responses have thus tended toward the draconian—by 
paralleling efforts to “end child labor” through targeting the work that is equated 
with trafficking or the migration that leads to it (Huijsmans and Baker 2012). This 
article critically assesses this issue by deconstructing what has been understood as 
a paradigmatic case of child trafficking—the labor migration of teenage boys from 
Benin to the artisanal gravel quarries of Abeokuta, Nigeria.1 Using data gathered 
between 2010 and 2012 from interviews and participant observation with these 
boys, their employers, and their communities, this article argues that these boys’ 
migrant labor is not equivalent to trafficking, is not experienced as such, and 
instead represents a reasoned response to a very narrow set of social and economic 
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life options. The article argues further that attempts to outlaw such labor practices 
are destined to fail. 
The Dominant Paradigm 
In the past 15 years, child trafficking has exploded as an international issue. The 
dominant discourse around it has constructed both the migration to worksites and 
the work itself as inherently problematic, resulting from a variety of pathological 
causes (Anderson and Andrijasevic 2008; Hashim 2003; Hashim and Thorsen 
2011; Huijsmans and Baker 2012; Morganti 2011; Whitehead, Hashim, and 
Iversen 2007). The dominant paradigm can be seen in many official publications. 
One particularly influential UNICEF report states:  
The trafficking of children is one of the gravest violations of human 
rights in the world today. Children and their families are ensnared by the 
empty promises of the trafficking networks—promises of a better life, of 
an escape route from poverty—and every year, hundreds of thousands of 
children are smuggled across borders and sold as mere commodities. 
Their survival and development are threatened, and their rights to 
education, to health, to grow up within a family, to protection from 
exploitation and abuse are denied. (UNICEF 2003, 6) 
 
The ILO echoes this perspective: 
Sometimes it is the children themselves or their families who take the 
initiative to migrate and who approach recruiters. Generally they have no 
idea of the fate that awaits them. Even if they are aware that hardships lie 
ahead, they rarely understand the nature nor the duration of the suffering 
they will face. … In the worst cases, it can [result in a] child’s 
disappearance or death, or can permanently damage his/her physical and 
mental health. (ILO-IPEC 2002, x–xi)  
 
 Within this discursive framework are a number of binaries—
consent/coercion, normal/abusive, legitimate/exploitative—which ignore 
important ambiguities, contingencies, and the structural contexts within which 
migration and trafficking take place and are experienced by those involved in 
labor migration.  
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This lack of nuance is reflected also in the international legal framework 
that has developed around child trafficking and in the mainstream policy efforts 
that seek to prevent it. According to this framework, three major factors 
differentiate child from adult trafficking. These are that (1) coercion or deception 
is not necessary for an exploitative act to constitute child trafficking, (2) that a 
minor’s consent to engage in exploitative labor is irrelevant and legally 
impossible, and (3) that exploitation is both broader and more specific than is the 
case with adults (ILO, UNICEF, and UNGIFT 2009). With adults, the term 
“exploitation” is often left undefined. The 2000 Palermo Protocol, for example, 
defines exploitation tautologically, as “the exploitation of the prostitution of others 
or other forms of sexual exploitation,” and exploitation also includes “forced labor 
or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the removal of 
organs” (United Nations [UN] 2000). With respect to children, exploitation is 
defined in two major ILO protocols: the Minimum Age Convention (ILO 1973) 
and the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention (ILO 1999). According to these 
conventions, exploitation is defined as work deemed by the competent authorities 
to “harm the health, safety, or morals of young persons.” The criteria prohibit 
virtually all types of labor, including mining, quarrying, fishing, factory work, and 
commercial agriculture.  
 As a result of this definition, policy efforts to fight trafficking (and child 
labor more generally) often operate by outlawing all child participation in 
economic sectors. This means that a young man aged 17 who has consented to 
difficult but relatively well-paid work in a quarry finds his work criminalized 
alongside the work of a five year-old child forced into domestic service. This can 
have grave consequences for the young people who either have little choice but to 
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engage in this kind of labor or who experience their work in those sectors as 
nonexploitative (Bourdillon et al. 2011; Dottridge 2007; Huijsmans and Baker 
2012).  
Research Methods 
To investigate the validity of the dominant discursive and policy paradigm around 
child trafficking, I conducted field research in Benin and Nigeria. The cases were 
selected for a number of reasons. The first of these was practical: I had previously 
worked in Benin for an antitrafficking nongovernmental organization (NGO), and 
this meant that I was well-placed to enjoy an empirical “head-start” when 
investigating the problems plaguing the field. Second, Benin had long been 
identified as a global “hotbed” of trafficking in children, after the infamous 
discovery in 2001 of a smuggler ship carrying apparent child slaves from its shores 
to Gabon and in 2003 after the expulsion of apparent child slaves from the quarries 
of Abeokuta, Nigeria (Alber 2011; Howard 2012b; Morganti 2011; U.S. 
Department of State 2005). Moreover, my previous experience and related 
research in Benin have demonstrated that Beninese discourse and policy closely 
resemble those operating at a global level (Alber 2011; Howard 2011; Morganti 
2011). Indeed, discourse in Benin constructs children’s work and their migration 
as inherently and unambiguously exploitative and thus equivalent to trafficking. It 
sees payment for a minor’s labor as equivalent to exploitation and holds that 
children should be in school instead of at work. Little distinction is made in 
practice between young children and the teenagers who enter the labor market. 
Policy and enforcement efforts target almost all youth work and migration.  
 In researching these issues, I decided that the most sensible strategy would 
be to examine the country’s apparently classic example of trafficking—that of 
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teenage boys moving from the Zou region of Southern Benin to the artisanal 
gravel quarries of Abeokuta in Nigeria. (Figure 1 depicts broader migration 
patterns to and from Benin.)  In concert with my research assistant (an NGO 
worker from the locality with many years of antitrafficking experience), I selected 
four case study villages, two from Za-Kpota commune2 and two from 
Zogbodomey, and in these villages I purposively sampled current and former 
migrants to the quarries, individuals involved in the migrant labor network linking 
the region to the quarries, and village authorities.  
 




 Field research in Benin took place in two stages: three months in 2007 and 
six months in 2010. My principle research tools were semi-structured, open-ended 
interviews and focus group discussions. Focus groups were especially useful for 
gathering group-level data pertaining to community perceptions of migration, 
labor, and other socioeconomic issues. The interviews were designed to develop a 
deeper understanding of how young migrants understand and experience their life-
worlds and to develop personal “migration histories” with a number of 
respondents. In addition to answering my specific questions, I allowed my 
interviewees to volunteer topics that they thought were relevant to my 
understanding of their lives. This strategy provided information that I might 
otherwise have missed.                       
 I undertook a month of follow-up research in February 2012, this time in 
and around the quarries themselves, in Abeokuta, Nigeria. This was an immensely 
valuable experience, as it allowed me not only to triangulate what I had heard on 
the Beninese side of the border, but also to engage young labor migrants at their 
place of work and, thus, in the midst of apparent trafficking and exploitation. The 
research in Abeokuta involved (1) observing the living and working conditions of 
those in the quarries and (2) interviewing young migrant laborers and other key 
actors engaged in the quarry economy, including labor leaders, gravel purchasers, 
traders, and transporters. I interviewed thirty youths who were or had been 
involved in the migrant labor network linking the Zou to Abeokuta, in addition to 
members of their communities and key individuals who were involved in 
organizing their labor. The latter included those who facilitated their migration, 
parents, village elders, and employers. I also observed the various living and 
working conditions of young quarry workers: I engaged with them at work, and 
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observed their dwellings, their eating places, and their interactions with other 
people.  
Though my research was comprehensive in the study sites and the data 
gathered by this approach was rich, my sample was not random. As such, it is not 
known how representative my findings are of larger patterns. Additionally, some 
researchers argue that young migrants may be inclined to depict their migration in 
largely positive terms (Lieblich, Zilber, and Tuval-Mashiach 2008), so it is 
possible that some of my respondents may have underplayed any negative aspects 
of their experiences, including the difficulty of the work or any harsh working 
conditions. This is arguably also true of the employers and labor-network 
organizers who rely on their work. However, given the wide scope of my 
ethnographic research and the fact that I was able to collect data from multiple 
vantage points (youths, parents, employers, etc.) in addition to my observations, I 
believe that my subjects’ accounts have a high degree of validity.  
Adolescent Labor Migration from Benin to Nigeria 
The dominant antitrafficking discourse within and beyond Benin constructs the 
world of Abeokuta’s quarries as a kind of hell experienced by “child slaves.”1 
While claims of child slavery are almost never verified, there is no doubt that 
young people engaged in artisanal mine or quarry work are often exposed to 
significant health risks. These can be particularly serious, as a recent Human 
Rights Watch (2011) report documented with respect to gold mining in Mali. 
In Benin and Nigeria, however, my research revealed a different picture—a 
complex world of social and economic relations, structured along highly 
 
1






hierarchical lines, and held together by money and interpersonal reciprocity. This 
section of the article outlines that structure and then reflects on the importance of 
money as well as noneconomic factors in the decision-making that shapes teenage 
boys’ labor migration. I then present four individual cases of migration 
experiences to illustrate the nuances in the migration process. 
 
Abeokuta’s quarries 
Several key actors are involved Abeokuta’s quarry economy. First, 
absentee Nigerian landlords own and rent out patches of land rich in the gravel 
that is ideal for use in the construction industry. Second, female Nigerian gravel 
dealers lease this land from those landlords and have contracts with them that date 
back two or three generations. These women represent the lynchpin in this 
economic system. They have come together to form a gravel dealers’ union and 
contract with a third group—lorry owners and drivers, who operate under their 
own union—to have the extracted gravel transported to a fourth group:  gravel 
purchasers in Lagos, Nigeria. Prices for gravel and for the services rendered by 
each of the links in this chain are predominantly set through negotiation between 
the unions representing the latter three groups.  
The gravel dealers contract with a fifth group: Beninese “bosses” who 
provide the migrant labor used to extract the gravel. These bosses are men from 
the Zou département in Benin and come predominantly from Za-Kpota and 
Zogbodomey communes. All have previously worked six-year apprenticeships 
under their own bosses until being “liberated.” Liberation means that they are 
given license by the hierarchy of the Beninese expatriate community—which 
provides and manages the labor-force in Abeokuta—to hire their own groups of 
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laborers. The laborers extract the gravel according to the directions of their bosses. 
It is the migrant teenage youths involved in this work who are officially identified 
as “trafficked.”  
Each teenage laborer is hired on a two-year contract, and is expected to 
work six days a week for his patron (boss), who in return houses, clothes, and 
feeds the young worker and pays him 140,000 FCFA (about $260, or an equivalent 
sum in material terms, e.g., a motorbike) upon completion of the contract. If the 
boy is a younger worker, it is possible that some of this money will have been 
advanced to his parents before he departed for work, since younger boys’ income 
is treated as family income much more commonly than that of older boys. The 
boys are free to work on their own account on their day off or when they have 
already loaded the lorry that is their day’s work for their boss. Though the work is 
hard, they work in groups of three, with the biggest and strongest pick-axing the 
ground, the second strongest shoveling the gravel, and the smallest sifting it 
through a filter. They rest when they need to, share the workload among them, and 
are often helped by the patron who is in many ways dependent on them. This 
dependence is not only intrinsic to the employer-employee relationship, however; 
it is also reflected in the fact that each patron relies on his reputation as a good 
employer to attract the laborers whose surplus he will ultimately extract; he has an 
interest in treating each of his charges sufficiently well that they will not tarnish 
his image when they return to Benin. Consequently, while no one would deny the 
inherent physical challenge of the work performed by these adolescents, it is an 
experience that over-taxes few of them and rarely is it any worse than the farm 
work they would otherwise be doing at home. As one interviewee, Jack, stated, 
“This is nothing compared to life on the farm.” 
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In line with this, these quarry-working adolescents and their communities 
strongly advocate what amounts to an “autonomy position” vis-à-vis their 
migration and work (Abramson 2003; Nussbaum 1998). Few deny that the work 
could be easier, that it could pay more, or that working conditions could be 
improved, but almost nobody I spoke to believed that youth labor migration should 
be criminalized—since for many it represents the best option of a very narrow set 
of economic options. When I asked people how they would like to see the 
problems in their lives and in this work addressed, the dominant response was, 
“Give us alternatives” and “Improve our contracts.” Crucially, since improving 
contracts often means raising wages, it should also be noted that these wages are 
themselves subject to serious structural pressure, being heavily contingent on the 
balance of class forces within (and beyond) the quarry economy. Only recently, 
and for the first time in history, did the patrons go on strike to renegotiate the 
earnings they take and from which they pay their workers. 
 
Money as the major motivator  
When examining the reasoning given by young males for their migration to 
work in these conditions, it is important to emphasize that money is almost 
universally identified as the major motivating factor. This is not to say that money 
is the only factor. Indeed, the need to acquire social status; to experience 
something beyond the village; and to be socialized into responsible, economically 
active adults are all undoubtedly significant.  
This can be illustrated by my research participants’ use of the Fon word 
“ya” (poverty). Though poverty frequently featured as an answer to the question, 
“Why do young people leave home?” further discussion revealed that poverty in 
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this context means specifically a lack of the cash necessary to “evolve.” 
Accordingly, when I asked people if poverty ever meant “starvation” and whether 
“poor” people remaining in the village “would go without food,” most individuals 
responded with an amused and resounding “no.” Pointedly, one man explained 
that “people don’t die of hunger here,” while another declared that “even when 
there are no fish to eat, people don’t starve … people wouldn’t let you starve; it’s 
just that there’s no money.”  
 Such linguistic digging was not necessary with all my interviewees. As the 
migration histories described below show, the importance of accessing money or 
material opportunity is viewed as an inevitable part of life under capitalism in a 
place as peripheral and poor as Benin. A selection of responses from one focus 
group discussion illustrates these perceptions:  
 
There is nothing in the village; there is no work. Parents are obliged to 
let their kids go and when kids decide themselves to leave, parents are 
obliged to accept. When they go, kids at least make some money, they at 
least send some back to us. We understand the NGOs’ message [that 
minors migrating for work is a bad thing], but we can’t eat their words 
can we?3  
 
If I’m not in Nigeria, I’m in Savè [in Central Benin] working, because 
that at least gives me some money. I remember that one NGO came and 
said don’t leave home, promising to bring money for those who stayed; 
but they never did. Those who stayed had been tricked and were really 
sad, especially in comparison to those who did leave and who made 
some money.4  
We don’t have the same view as the NGOs [that migrating for work in 
Abeokuta is bad]. We think it can be a good thing to leave, especially as 
it is a way to find money. We leave despite what they say.5 
 
When I work in Nigeria, I earn some money and am able to put some 
aside to buy a motorbike, buy electricity for my house, or other such 
things. I can keep migrating back and forth like this every time I need to 
put together some funds. The only problem for me is that when relatives 
are sick, I have to send some of my wages back.6 
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These perspectives were common in my research communities in Benin and 
among the young males who were working in Nigeria’s gravel pits. They have 
also been echoed in a few similar studies, conducted in artisanal quarry economies 
elsewhere in the region (e.g., Grätz, 2003, 2009; Hilson 2008; Okyere 2012), as 
well in studies with teenage labor migrants who engage in other types of work and 
are assumed to be trafficked (e.g., Castle and Diarra 2003; Huijsmans and Baker 
2012; Morganti 2011).  
During my fieldwork in 2012, I visited a school attended by youths from two 
of my case-study villages in Za-Kpota. When introducing myself and my research 
to a class of forty students, I asked why people there seemed to see migration to 
Abeokuta as a good thing. A sea of voices erupted with the Fon word, “Akwe”—
money. It is worth reflecting, then, on why there is such a lack of monetary 
resources in the Zou region of Benin, compelling young people to migrate to 
Abeokuta to earn money. Although my interviewees stated that the economic links 
between the Zou and Abeokuta date back many decades, there is some evidence 
that these links have expanded and have become entrenched in response to the 
recent world decline in cotton prices. Cliff, a village head and a former cotton 
farmer, argued:  
 
When cotton earned well [back in the mid-1990s], children and 
families all worked and earned good money. When it worked, no-one 
went to Nigeria because there was so much to do, people had 
disposable cash; children even had money and went to school. When 




Likewise, another respondent claimed that if cotton earned as much now as it had 
in the past, all the young migrants currently in Abeokuta would be in Benin and in 
school. In making sense of this claim, we should recall that cotton is Benin’s 
single major cash-crop and in the Zou it represents the only cash-providing work. 
 
Relationships and transitions 
Though earning money underpins all labor migration, we should not see 
such migration as a one-dimensional, strictly monetary phenomenon. In my 
interviews with youth who worked in quarries, other socially important 
dimensions emerged. One of these involved a desire to fulfill their social 
responsibility as providers for their families—as illustrated in the refrain of 
working to “put a roof on my father’s house.” But more individualized motives are 
also significant. These motives include attaining respect and status, or acquiring 
the material resources necessary to marry. In terms of social respect, it is 
significant that one of the major motifs I heard when reflecting with interviewees 
on the value of migration was that, if successful, it can offer the chance for an 
individual to become “considered.” To be considered (or known) in this part of 
Southern Benin means to be well thought of or respected as an important or 
successful person. It is an essential goal for many people, and successful migration 
is a principal means of achieving it. Numerous interviewees explained that 
returning from Abeokuta with material goods such as a motorbike, clothes, or a 
generator represented visible evidence of an individual’s successful migration and 
thus constituted a material path to their being considered by those around them 
upon their return. 
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 Manhood and the subsequent life-stage of marriage are also linked to 
material success. My village interviews revealed that when and how one 
transitions from the status of “boy” to “man” is neither fixed nor universally 
attributed to biological age, but is instead contingent on the attainment of 
economic independence. In one group interview, for instance, an adolescent 
explained, with the agreement of his peers, that one is a man in his community 
when “he works and eats without the help of his parents.”8 His assessment was 
echoed by another young man, who declared that to be a man in his village is “to 
farm, to have a big harvest, and to be able to sell your crops.”9 As many youth 
lamented to me, however, this accomplishment and the subsequent transition to 
marriage is now more difficult than ever. Where being self-sufficient through 
successfully farming land had, historically, been the major indicator that one was a 
man—materially independent and thus able to support a wife and family—today 
the declining soil fertility, decreasing size of landholdings as a result of population 
growth, and increasing importance of the monetized economy meant that more and 
more teenage boys are finding their path to the material independence blocked. 
These youth thus need new strategies for self-articulation (Sommers 2012). 
Crucially, it is often independent labor migration that represents the preferred 
solution, as is increasingly the case across the region (De Lange 2007; Hashim and 
Thorsen 2011). 
 
Selected migration stories  
 The following section presents a few typical cases of teenage migration 
experiences. The cases reflect the normative experiences of the boys who I 
encountered both in the villages in Benin and in the mining sites in Abeokuta. As 
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has been suggested above, money represents a central motivator for the boys in 
question, as do social responsibility and the social transitions to manhood and 
marriage. Given that antitrafficking discourse depicts their work experiences as 
essentially slavery, it is crucial to document the youths’ own descriptions of their 
migration experiences and subsequent working conditions. 
 
Jack 
Jack was a 15-year-old boy from a village on the border between Za-Kpota 
commune and the commune of Bohicon. I interviewed him in Abeokuta at his 
place of work. He was open, friendly, and confident. Our encounter was very 
jovial.  
Jack came to Abeokuta a year prior to our interview and needed to work in 
the quarries for another year to complete the standard two-year contract. In return 
for his labor, he was to receive a motorbike at the end of his two years, which was 
the price agreed upon by him, his parents, and his patron. On top of this, Jack also 
worked in his free time and “on his own account.” He said that he was able to earn 
around 2000 Naira (about $12) every week by working overtime. His relationship 
with his boss was also very good, and he claimed that he was not mistreated, never 
shouted at, and was well fed.  
Jack was saving his money week by week and aiming to return to Benin to 
set himself up in a trade. When I asked him why he came to Nigeria, he was very 
clear that his goal was to earn money. Work in Nigeria was much better than it 
was at home, he believed, because in Nigeria he could earn a lot and also got to 
keep what he earned. Though the work was hard, earning money made it all 
worthwhile. Jack was also very clear that working on the family farm was much 
 17 
more physically demanding than in the gravel pits, even though the former was 
legal while the latter was not. He was strongly opposed to any laws forbidding 
young people like him to migrate to Nigeria to work. 
 
Zeze 
Zeze was a 17-year-old young man from a village on the border between 
the communes of Za-Kpota and Bohicon. I interviewed him while he was working 
in Abeokuta. He first came to the Abeokutan quarries as a result of a family 
tragedy. He was in his village in Benin when his father fell seriously ill. After a 
long and drawn-out illness, his father eventually passed away. At that point, older 
male relatives suggested that Zeze come to work with them in Abeokuta, but 
Zeze’s mother refused. She herself then fell ill, however, passing away shortly 
afterward. It was at this point that Zeze migrated with his relatives. He was 11 
years old at the time. 
At the time of the interview, Zeze was finishing the third of three 
consecutive two-year contracts. After the first two years, he had earned enough 
money to return and build himself a house. His earnings from the second two years 
had given him enough money to furnish the house. Now, with the money he would 
earn from this third contract, he was planning to buy a motorbike. For Zeze, work 
at the gravel pits was not a challenge. He grew up working in the fields, he said, 
which more than prepared one for the lesser rigors of life in Nigeria, even if the 
work was challenging. 
Since he soon would complete the six years necessary for his 
“apprenticeship,” Zeze would be “free” either to work entirely for himself or to 
hire other young laborers to work under him. His plan, however, was to return to 
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Benin and see whether he could start a business, though he added that if the 
business faltered, he would return to Abeokuta to earn money. 
Money was, for Zeze, the single motivation for his continued presence in 
Nigeria. When I asked him why people came, “money” was his answer. He stated 
that if there were alternatives in Benin—if the state were to set up formal 
apprenticeships and give people jobs—he would stay and work there. But he had 
little belief that this would happen and was very disdainful when asked what he 
thought of the antitrafficking message that says young people such as him should 
not migrate for work. Such migration was crucial, he said, if one wanted to make 
something of one’s life. 
 
Placide 
Placide was a small, sickly young man of 16. Unlike the majority of the 
other interviewees, his experience of labor migration to Abeokuta was negative. 
He migrated when he was 14. He had been an apprentice mechanic for four 
months beforehand but when his boss asked for some money from his parents and 
they were unable to pay it, his apprenticeship ended. This was when a fellow 
villager suggested that he go with him to Nigeria.  
Before long, the work overcame Placide and he fell ill. For six months, his 
patron took care of him. Since his condition never improved, however, the patron 
brought him home to his parents. Eventually, when healed, the same patron asked 
Placide to return to Nigeria to work with him, but Placide refused; he claimed that 
the man had lied about how difficult the working conditions actually were. 
Placide’s father supported his refusal. He later worked in the fields with his father. 
It is arguable that Placide’s case represents an example of trafficking, both in the 
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formal legal sense and in the sense that is more commonly understood, given the 
apparent presence of deception on the part of the man who exploited his labor. 
 
Trevor 
In his mid-40s, Trevor was an influential figure in Za-Kpota commune, and 
ran a successful local business that employed many young interns, including a 
number sponsored by an NGO to stay at “home” instead of migrating for work. 
We first met in 2007, when he was introduced to me by a local government 
official as “a former trafficker” who had apparently repented and decided to mend 
his ways. He became one of the most significant participants in my research, 
meeting with me on myriad occasions and facilitating my access to a large group 
of “traffickers”/patrons involved in the migrant labor network linking the Zou 
département to the quarries of Abeokuta.  
Trevor first migrated to Abeokuta himself when he was 11 or 12. He did so 
because he was poor and because he and his family had seen others from their 
community migrate and return with riches. He worked for five years in Abeokuta 
and returned with a bike, a radio and 25,000 FCFA ($45)—not an insignificant 
haul for a 16 year-old in the 1980s. At 16, after a brief period at home, he returned 
to Abeokuta for a further six years, becoming a patron and also engaging in the 
production of sodabi, the region’s palm wine.  
During his time as a patron, Trevor returned to Za-Kpota every two years 
and routinely brought more boys with him back to Nigeria. Parents and boys 
themselves would approach him on his visits to ask if he could find them work. 
Sometimes, when boys were young (between 10 and 14), an advance on the boys’ 
wages would be paid to the parents, who would negotiate the contract on the 
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child’s behalf. In these cases, a boy’s earnings would be considered like any other 
component of the family economy. Parents (particularly fathers) made decisions 
over the allocation of household labor power. It should be noted that, unlike the 
dominant antitrafficking discourse, the communities in Benin do not equate this 
relationship to a sale of their offspring. 
By contrast, when the boys who Trevor “placed” were older (in their mid- 
to late teens), they would themselves often negotiate their own two-year contracts 
and would keep their wages upon its completion. This is absolutely in keeping 
with local developmental norms, which see teenage males progressively 
incorporated into adulthood and independence. Trevor was adamant that his 
relationships with all his workers were good and that he never mistreated any of 
them, even if he admitted that some other patrons certainly did. He emphasized 
this by introducing me to some of the men who sat around his shop—these men 
had become his friends after having themselves “graduated” from under him in 
Abeokuta. 
In 2003, Trevor left Abeokuta and Nigeria, returning to Benin to start his 
business. He explained his decision as a result of the “crisis” that befell the 
Beninese expatriate labor community during that year and the violence and 
conflict that resulted. He said that at one point he was mugged, that the police had 
raided the quarries and made him pay a fine, and that quarry work was declining in 
profitability. He therefore cut his losses and exited the quarry economy. 
Trevor maintained personal links with the quarry economy, nonetheless, 
and was one of the most ardent critics of the dominant antitrafficking campaign. In 
each of my many encounters with him, he described in depth the corruption of 
politicians and formal institutions that promised riches to encourage people to stay 
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home or to vote for them and yet never delivered anything. In one of our 
discussions, he picked up a piece of tape and shouted, “If I earn one of these here 
but five of them there, why the hell would I stay here?” He was also very clear that 
at times the work in Abeokuta could constitute exploitation: “especially if, as the 
boss, I sit in the shade with a beer while the boys work in the sun,” or “if I don’t 
pay what I’ve agreed.” In the majority of cases, however, this was not the 
situation, and the boys he worked with did not define their work as exploitative. In 
an ideal world, he said, working conditions could be improved across the board 
and alternatives to labor migration could be provided. 
Conclusion 
The qualitative findings presented above are not isolated to a few cases but are 
instead illustrative of broader findings—based on observations at the study sites; 
focus groups; and more than 100 interviews with young labor migrants, their 
parents, community members, and employers (see also Howard 2012a). The 
results are consistent with the findings of the few related studies of minors 
involved in labor migration and trafficking (Gozdziak 2012; Hashim and Thorsen 
2011; Huijsmans and Baker 2012; Morganti 2011; Okyere 2012; Whitehead, 
Hashim, and Iversen 2007).  
The central goal of this project was to interrogate the validity of the 
dominant child trafficking discourse and the utility of the policies to which it is 
related. The materials presented in this article bring that validity and utility into 
serious question. In this final section, I further expand on my findings, 
emphasizing the three major differences between the dominant trafficking 
discourse and the narratives offered by “trafficked” minors. These pertain to why 
adolescent males are trafficked or migrate for work, how those adolescents 
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experience that work, and what alternative policies they advocate with regard to 
their labor migration. 
According to the dominant discourse, then, work such as that performed by 
teenagers in Abeokuta constitutes a “worst form of child labor,” akin to slavery 
and often involving horrific exploitation and abuse. It represents a classic example 
of “trafficking” and “unfree labor” in the commonly understood sense of the 
terms. By contrast, my data, obtained from precisely these “victims of trafficking,” 
present an altogether different image. Young migrants interviewed in this study 
reported that, while challenging and at times even overwhelming, their work was 
nothing like slavery. Rather, it was normal in their economic context, and was 
rarely more taxing than what they would have been doing had they remained on 
their family farms. Similarly, while the antitrafficking discourse often 
characterizes the monetization of a minor’s mobility as indicative of 
abuse/trafficking, these young men reported that it was their ability to earn money 
that made their mobility appealing in the first place. The “commodification” of 
childhood therefore only seems problematic for those whose understanding of the 
life-course is that the young should be excluded from the “cash nexus” (Zelizer 
1994). In places such as Benin, where such luxuries are impossible, incorporation 
of the young as money-earning agents is materially and socially essential.  
 Such dissonance is paralleled in the two causal narratives that serve to 
explain why young people leave home for what they define as work and what the 
antitrafficking establishment identifies as trafficking. I argue that the discourse 
revolves around a pathological paradigm that equates work and migration with 
trafficking (Howard 2011). Within this paradigm, it is assumed that no well-
informed, well-intentioned parent would choose to let a child migrate for work. It 
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is also assumed that children neither could nor would independently make such a 
choice. As such, “poverty,” “ignorance,” “trickery” and “the corruption of 
tradition” are all identified as the agency-denying causal factors explaining youth 
labor migration. The very essence of this discursive edifice rules out consideration 
of the mediating situational, sociocultural, or political-economic nuances that 
studies of migration clearly demonstrate as important in labor-migratory decision-
making (De Haas 2010). Data collected from the young labor migrants in Benin 
and Abeokuta show just how reductive the mainstream antitrafficking paradigm is. 
Similar to other studies of young labor migrants (Castle and Diarra 2003; Gozdiak 
2012; Hashim and Thorsen 2011; Morganti 2011; Okyere 2012; Whitehead, 
Hashim, and Iversen 2007), I found that the boys or their parents make agentive, 
money-oriented, and socially grounded choices around labor migration. Those 
choices are not pathological—they are conditioned by the knowledge that money 
is necessary to any life project and that earnings are available outside one’s home 
village.  
It follows that the kinds of policies that young migrants and their 
communities would like to see deployed in an effort to “protect” them or to 
improve their living conditions differ radically from the policies advocated by the 
dominant international antitrafficking movement and governments aligned with it. 
As discussed earlier, the mainstream antitrafficking strategy generally rests on an 
attempt to prevent minors from entering the world of work, therefore prohibiting 
all youth labor mobility. By contrast, when asked what policies they would like to 
see pursued, young migrant laborers and their community members responded, 
first, that they should be provided economic alternatives to labor migration. “Give 
us jobs”; “Promote development”; “Bring industry here”; “Pay us more for our 
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crops”; “Give us what you have”; and “Train us in skills” were refrains I 
frequently heard. The general point being that “if we want to progress, we need to 
migrate, so if you don’t want us to migrate, you need to bring here what we can 
access there.” The second major aspect was similarly widespread and is 
encapsulated in the phrase: “improve our working conditions.” Since very few see 
the kinds of work that young males engage in when they migrate as inherently 
problematic, and since all seem to accept the structural unavoidability of 
monetized social relations, it is extremely rare to find anyone who would like to 
see that work prohibited. At best, people desire improved labor relations. The 
alternatives most frequently heard were “Pay us more wages”; “Have us work 
fewer hours”; and “Let the government stop employers [from] exploiting us.”  
The internationally dominant antitrafficking policy, however, avoids 
engaging with the structures that prevent this desired investment or that impede 
any regional economic growth. Young migrants and their communities, therefore, 
perceive themselves as having few other options but to navigate the obstacles that 
antitrafficking policy puts in their path, and to go about their business as they 
otherwise would were those obstacles not a reality. This is clearly illustrated by 
how many of my interviewees described their decision-making and their own lived 
resistance to the central tenets of formal, antitrafficking dictates, which is captured 
in the following statements: 
NH: Do you pretend to the NGOs and government, saying one thing to 
them [that you will not migrate] and doing another? 
There was a lot of laughter amongst those that understood my question. 
Everybody said “yes, they do.”10 
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NH: So you just pretend to the authorities then? 
Yes, of course. We say “sure, we won’t leave” in the hope that they’ll 
bring us something.11 
 
NH: How do you go about getting around the authorities? 
They said the state has set up village [antitrafficking] committees all 
over the place, but these are corrupt: “We can easily turn them and take 
kids away no problem.” There are also many paths that you can take 
towards and across the border and the state has no idea about them all. 
The police sit there and guard the ones they know about and so we just 
take the others.12 
 
A policy failure occurs when a policy does “not achieve its stated 
objectives” (Castles 2003, 207). These quotes and my wider research findings 
suggest that the prevailing antitrafficking policy in Benin is indeed failing in these 
terms. My data indicate that very few young labor migrants pay any heed to 
attempts to prevent their migration. In fact, antitrafficking efforts appear to 
constitute little more than an irritating obstacle for these young migrants and those 
facilitating their migration. It seems reasonable to conclude both that the dominant 
international and Beninese antitrafficking discourse is fundamentally flawed and 
that policies emerging from it are doomed to fail. Until antitrafficking activists and 
government officials engage more critically with their own assumptions and more 
deeply with realities on the ground, the discourse is unlikely to change.  
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Notes 
 
1 The words “quarries” and “gravel pits” are used interchangeably here.  
2 Commune and départment are French terms for political-administrative units in Benin. 
3 Adult male, focus group 3, 4/16/2010. 
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4 16-year-old male, focus group 3, 4/16/2010. 
5 Adult woman, focus group 3, 4/16/2010. 
6 17-year-old male, focus group 3, 4/16/2010. 
7 Interview with Cliff, Zelele village, 4/7/2010. 
8 16-year-old male, focus group 11, Tenga village, 5/14/2010.  
9 Interview with Pietro, Zelele village, 5/10/2010. 
10 Focus group 5, Zelele village, 4/26/2010. 
11 Interview with Artur, Sehere village, Zakpota, 4/12/2010. 
12 Focus group 2, 4/12/2010. 
